Troikanomics pp 83-107 | Cite as

The Troika and Austerity: A Destructive Dyad

  • Ray Kinsella
  • Maurice Kinsella


In this chapter we reflect on the genesis and experience of Troikanomics—a politically venal and discriminatory artefact operating as a ‘fiscal enforcer’ for dominant Eurozone countries. Its retrospective rationalisation is that, notwithstanding its flaws, it worked—in the sense that Europe is now recovering. This is, however, problematic; for example, Italy remains highly vulnerable, and the European economy is still hostage to political risk. This perspective also takes no account of the deeper socioeconomic scarring imposed by Troikanomics - whose costs have been transferred across generations. Nor, it should be added, of the latent risks that having enforced such a destructive adjustment process, it may revert to a similar approach in some future crisis—'well it worked before, didn't it?' Alongside this, it is important to acknowledge the measures that were taken by countries such as Ireland, on their own initiative, to foster recovery - contributing towards the adjustment process. Finally, Troikanomics set a pattern essentially based on a cult of dependency - that sense of the gravitational pull towards the centre rather than enabling and empowering countries to manage adjustment through their own autonomous capabilities. The reality is that under the yoke of Troikanomics, countries were constrained by the pressures of desperation, dependence, and duress. We should also note that the existential experience of Troikanomics slips so easily into a memory that is not shared by the current generation.


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ray Kinsella
    • 1
  • Maurice Kinsella
    • 2
  1. 1.Michael Smurfit Graduate School of Business (Formerly)Co DublinIreland
  2. 2.The Galilee House of StudiesAthyIreland

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