Structure, Funding and Socio-economic Imperatives of Boko Haram

  • Edlyne Eze Anugwom
Part of the New Directions in Islam book series (NDI)


This chapter analyses the structure and funding of Boko Haram as well as interrogates the validity of the socio-economic imperatives of the sect. Boko Haram is structured and run on the popular Shura council model. This structure, which operated on the basis of loosely connected and semi-autonomy, is headed by Shekau who, while ensuring the activities of the various cells, maintain little personal contact. This has helped in making Shekau invincible and ensuring that the vanquishing of one cell does not affect the others. The sect depended on multiple sources of funding ranging from membership dues, donations and political patronage during the era of Yusuf to looting, robbery and ransom in the era of Shekau. Boko Haram has been able to remain financially buoyant throughout its life. While the economic and social deprivation in the Northeast may have aided both the popularity of the sect and its ability to attract young people to its fold, the socio-economic explanation is just one in a cocktail of factors driving the insurgence.


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© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Edlyne Eze Anugwom
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Sociology and AnthropologyUniversity of Nigeria NsukkaNsukkaNigeria

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