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Towards Bidirectional Ratcheted Key Exchange

  • Bertram Poettering
  • Paul Rösler
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10991)

Abstract

Ratcheted key exchange (RKE) is a cryptographic technique used in instant messaging systems like Signal and the WhatsApp messenger for attaining strong security in the face of state exposure attacks. RKE received academic attention in the recent works of Cohn-Gordon et al. (EuroS&P 2017) and Bellare et al. (CRYPTO 2017). While the former is analytical in the sense that it aims primarily at assessing the security that one particular protocol does achieve (which might be weaker than the notion that it should achieve), the authors of the latter develop and instantiate a notion of security from scratch, independently of existing implementations. Unfortunately, however, their model is quite restricted, e.g. for considering only unidirectional communication and the exposure of only one of the two parties.

In this article we resolve the limitations of prior work by developing alternative security definitions, for unidirectional RKE as well as for RKE where both parties contribute. We follow a purist approach, aiming at finding strong yet convincing notions that cover a realistic communication model with fully concurrent operation of both participants. We further propose secure instantiations (as the protocols analyzed or proposed by Cohn-Gordon et al. and Bellare et al. turn out to be weak in our models). While our scheme for the unidirectional case builds on a generic KEM as the main building block (differently to prior work that requires explicitly Diffie–Hellman), our schemes for bidirectional RKE require a stronger, HIBE-like component.

Notes

Acknowledgments

We thank Fabian Weißberg for very inspiring discussions at the time we first explored the topic of ratcheted key exchange. We further thank Giorgia Azzurra Marson and anonymous reviewers for comments and feedback on the article. (This holds especially for a EUROCRYPT 2018 reviewer who identified an issue in a prior version of our URKE construction.) Bertram Poettering conducted part of the work at Ruhr University Bochum supported by ERC Project ERCC (FP7/615074). Paul Rösler received support by SyncEnc, funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF, FKZ: 16KIS0412K).

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Information Security GroupRoyal Holloway, University of LondonEghamUK
  2. 2.Horst-Görtz Institute for IT Security, Chair for Network and Data SecurityRuhr-University BochumBochumGermany

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