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Dual Process Theories for Calculus

  • Mario Graziano
Chapter
Part of the SpringerBriefs in Philosophy book series (BRIEFSPHILOSOPH)

Abstract

The dual process theories are popular in many domains of psychology, such as reasoning, decision making, social cognition, cognitive development, clinical psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. In the last chapter, this theoretical approach is applied, for the first time, to the studies on numerical cognition with the aim of review the results brought about by psychological and neuroscientific studies conducted on numerical cognition and laying the foundations of a new potential philosophical explanation on mathematical knowledge.

Keywords

Dual process theories Maddy scientific naturalism Liberal naturalism Evolution 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Cognitive SciencesUniversity of MessinaMessinaItaly

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