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Conclusions

  • Ettore Croci
Chapter

Abstract

This chapter contains some concluding remarks. Boards have attracted a great deal of interest because they are complicated, and many questions about them lack simple answers. Recent literature has certainly brought some clarity on several issues, but this clarity does not go hand in hand with simple one-size-fits-all solutions. The advances in the literature have made a strong case for a more nuanced approach to corporate board regulation: what is good for the average firm can be detrimental for others. To adopt this more nuanced approach, it is probably time to go beyond the idea of good versus bad corporate governance. Future research should answer the question whether it is optimal to regulate the board of directors less instead of proposing one-size-fits-all approaches.

Keywords

Boards Good governance Bad governance Regulation One-size-fits-all 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ettore Croci
    • 1
  1. 1.Università Cattolica del Sacro CuoreMilanoItaly

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