Analytic Narratives

  • Mark Koyama
Part of the Palgrave Studies in Economic History book series (PEHS)


Analytic narratives are used to understand historical phenomena where the data required to employ econometrics is lacking. This methodological approach allows for the analysis of a historical setting using economic theory or arguments combined with historical evidence that can be diverse in nature. Analytic narratives offer interesting alternatives to general formal models which may not be suited to understanding a particular case study or historical institution. A series of examples illustrate potential areas of application in economic history.

JEL Classification

A12 B41 B52 N01 

Reading List

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mark Koyama
    • 1
  1. 1.George Mason UniversityFairfaxUSA

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