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Metacognition As Evidence for Evidentialism

  • Matthew Frise
Chapter
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 398)

Abstract

Metacognition is the monitoring and controlling of cognitive processes. I examine the role of metacognition in ‘ordinary retrieval cases’, cases in which it is intuitive that via recollection the subject has a justified belief. Drawing on psychological research on metacognition, I argue that evidentialism has a unique, accurate prediction in each ordinary retrieval case: the subject has evidence for the proposition she justifiedly believes. But, I argue, process reliabilism has no unique, accurate predictions in these cases. I conclude that ordinary retrieval cases better support evidentialism than process reliabilism. This conclusion challenges several common assumptions. One is that non-evidentialism alone allows for a naturalized epistemology, i.e., an epistemology that is fully in accordance with scientific research and methodology. Another is that process reliabilism fares much better than evidentialism in the epistemology of memory.

Keywords

Metacognition Memory Naturalized epistemology Ordinary retrieval Reliabilism 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Matthew Frise
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophySanta Clara UniversitySanta ClaraUSA

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