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The Truth in Psychiatry and Neurosciences

  • Juan Ernesto Calderón
Chapter

Abstract

Truth is a concept always present in scientific activity, but which is not frequently thematized, due to the fact that the classic definition of truth, ‘adequation of the intellect to the thing’, is still valid with different shades. Martin Heidegger first and Hans Georg Gadamer later sustained that the conception of truth as the correspondence or adequation of the intellect to the thing was established in a germinal of the Western thought, specifically in Plato’s work. This definition of truth replaces the original meaning of the Greek word a-letheia, meaning ‘unconcealment’. This article states that another conception of truth is in force, which can be useful in scientific research and practice. In particular, (1) this paper will analyse a definition of truth as ‘unconcealment’ introduced by Phenomenology and Philosophical Hermeneutics; and (2) it will also demonstrate the usefulness of this notion in the field of Psychiatry and Neuroscience. For these purposes, this paper will deal in the first place, with the problem of method and understanding in Hermeneutics and the rigour which scientific knowledge can reach. Then, the notion of truth according to the hermeneutic conception will be developed. Finally, the impact of this difference in the conception of truth for scientific practice will be analysed, placing special emphasis on Neurosciences and Psychiatry.

Keywords

Truth Adequation Unconcealment Phenomenology Hermeneutics Psychiatry Neurosciences 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Juan Ernesto Calderón
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy and LiteratureNational University of Cuyo, Centro UniversitarioMendozaArgentina

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