Voluntary Delisting and Agency Costs: The Case of the London Stock Exchange
This chapter analyzes the link between delisting operations and agency costs by using a sample of non-financial firms which voluntarily delisted from the London Stock Exchange main market between 2010 and 2016. This chapter also explains the level and variability of ROA and the ratio between free cash flow and total assets as a proxy for agency costs through leverage and market-to-book ratio as proxies for market access, intangible assets on total assets as proxy for asymmetric information, and the company’s listing age.
KeywordsAgency costs Voluntary delisting London Stock Exchange Non-financial firms Asymmetric information Access to capital
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