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Leveraged Buyouts, Going Dark and the Change of the Trading Venue

  • Ottorino Morresi
Chapter

Abstract

Although the firm can leave the stock market in many ways, a leveraged buyout (LBO) is undeniably the most common and probably the most important method for achieving delisting. This chapter concentrates on LBOs in terms of historical trends, characteristics, and motivations. Moreover, some delisted firms do not cease to be traded on the public market but simply move from official, regulated markets to either unregulated, OTC markets, or less regulated markets. Although the choice is partially motivated by the same reasons that drive delisting, the second chapter also highlights the specific factors that can trigger the choice, typically related to the difference between the market of origin and destination.

Keywords

Leveraged buyout Going dark Trading venue Agency costs Tax benefits Second markets OTC markets 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ottorino Morresi
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsRoma Tre UniversityRomeItaly

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