Predication and Regress: In Virtue of What is a F?

  • Guido Imaguire
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 397)


This chapter deals with one of the main arguments for Priority Nominalism: the regress argument against the possibility of finding an explanation for predication. Indeed, since the priority nominalist considers predication a fundamental ontological relation, regress arguments are one of his main weapons against all rivals. Accordingly, the main aim of this chapter will be to show that all strategies used for blocking a regress are faulty. These strategies are: the identity of level solution, the quantificational solution, the formal relation solution, the internal relation solution and the truthmaking and grounding solutions. The straightforward conclusion is: once you destroy the unity of a thick object (i.e. you separate the particular from its properties) then (as with Humpty Dumpty) you can never it back together again.


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© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Guido Imaguire
    • 1
  1. 1.Universidade Federal do Rio de JaneiroRio de JaneiroBrazil

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