Agent Based Modelling and Simulation of an Auction Market for Airport Slots Allocation
Airport slot allocation is a combinatorial allocation problem involving different complex and autonomous systems. Nowadays, airport slots are allocated in a two-stage process: primary allocation is performed according to a set of administrative rules and for each airport independently, while secondary allocation is based on trading mechanisms. Several studies have raised inefficiencies in these processes. To enhance the airport slot allocation process we use an auction-based market. More specifically, we present an airport slot allocation mechanism based on a price-setting auction that has been implemented and evaluated by means of Agent-Based Modelling (ABM) and simulation techniques. The solutions obtained using our approach are compared and assessed with the ones obtained using linear programing, showing that market mechanisms can be an efficient alternative to the current administrative procedure.
KeywordsAgent-Based Modelling Simulation Air transport management Airport slot allocation Combinatorial auction
This research has been partially financed by the project ABARNET (Agent-Based Algorithms for Railway NETworks optimization) financed by the Spanish Ministry of Economy, Industry and Competitiviness, with grant DPI2016-78902-P, and the Project Computational Models for Industrial Management (CM4IM) project, funded by the Valladolid University General Foundation. It has also been financed by the Regional Government of Castille and Leon and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF, FEDER), with grant VA049P17, LONJA 3D.
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