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Multilevel Drivers: The International Level and the Devolved Level (Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales)

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Climate and Energy Governance for the UK Low Carbon Transition

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Abstract

This chapter considers the Climate Change Act from a ‘multilevel’ perspective, directly integrating the international level and the subnational level of governance into the analysis. It begins with consideration of the impact of the international level on the UK framework and also reverses this focus in order to recognise the influence that the Climate Change Act has exerted itself on the international arena. Next, the analysis proceeds to critique the ‘national’ Climate Change Act’s relationship to the UK’s complex subnational level, honing in on the UK’s devolved jurisdictions (Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales). Special detailed attention is accorded towards the end of the chapter to Scotland’s pioneering Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The UNFCCC defines ‘climate change’ as: ‘A change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods’. UNFCCC, Article 1(2).

  2. 2.

    For example, reporting duties on progress towards greenhouse gas emissions reduction (UNFCCC, Article 12).

  3. 3.

    On the design of the UNFCCC, see further J. von Stein, ‘The International Law and Politics of Climate Change: Ratification of the United Nations Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol’ 52(2) Journal of Conflict Resolution 243 (2008).

  4. 4.

    Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

  5. 5.

    Kyoto Protocol, ibid., Article 3(1).

  6. 6.

    See further Chapter 2, on the detail of the Act.

  7. 7.

    An insightful account of the Kyoto Protocol in terms of both the negotiation process and the substance of the Protocol is provided by S. Oberthur, H.E. Ott, The Kyoto Protocol: International Climate Policy for the 21st Century (Springer, Germany, 1999).

  8. 8.

    The USA continues to resist ratification at the time of writing; although the 2008–2012 Kyoto compliance period itself has closed, UNFCCC Article 22 keeps the option to subscribe to the Protocol open, such that compliance can be linked to future international action under the UNFCCC framework.

  9. 9.

    See UNFCCC, Annex I.

  10. 10.

    See J. Hovi, D.F Sprinz, G. Bang, ‘Why the United States Did Not Become a Party to the Kyoto Protocol: German, Norwegian and US Perspectives’ 18(1) European Journal of International Relations 129 (2010).

  11. 11.

    In addition to being facilitated by the form and structure of the EU’s own internal workings, this sort of approach was enabled by international provisions including Kyoto Protocol Article 4. See further M. Grubb, ‘The Economics of the Kyoto Protocol’ 4(3) World Economics 143 (2003).

  12. 12.

    DECC, UK Progress Towards GHG Emissions Reduction Targets : Statistical Release (HM Government, 2015), p. 3, ‘Kyoto Protocol Target’.

  13. 13.

    S. Charnovitz, ‘Trade and Climate: Potential Conflicts and Synergies’, in J. Aldy, et al. (eds.) Beyond Kyoto: Advancing the International Effort Against Climate Change (Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 2003).

  14. 14.

    See Chapter 4, ‘The Kyoto Protocol and Beyond’, and subsequent chapters, in S. Afionis (ed.) The European Union in International Climate Change Negotiations (Routledge, UK, 2017).

  15. 15.

    The 13th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (or ‘COP’) to the UNFCCC.

  16. 16.

    The Bali Action Plan, Decision 1/CP.13.

  17. 17.

    The Copenhagen Accord of 18 December 2009, Decision 2/CP.15 (United Nations, 2009).

  18. 18.

    Copenhagen Accord, ibid., Article 1.

  19. 19.

    Indeed, the EU had announced a commitment to ramp up an intended EU target of 20% greenhouse gas emissions reductions on 1990 levels for 2020 (discussed below) to a substantially higher 30% target if the UNFCCC developed countries would agree to take similarly progressive action; see, e.g., the European Commission’s Limiting Global Climate Change to 2 degrees Celsius : The Way Ahead for 2020 and Beyond, COM (2007) 2 final, p. 2.

  20. 20.

    Kyoto Protocol (Amendment) Decision 1/CMP.8.

  21. 21.

    This required significant amendment to Kyoto Protocol Article 3.

  22. 22.

    See further P. Sands, J. Peel, with A. Fabra, R. MacKenzie, Principles of International Environmental Law (4th edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018), p. 317.

  23. 23.

    Adoption of the Paris Agreement, FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1.

  24. 24.

    See further D. Bodansky, ‘The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement’ 25(2) Review of European Comparative and International Environmental Law 142 (2016).

  25. 25.

    See further the discussion in A. Frank (ed.) ‘Paris Climate Agreement: Success or Failure?’ Cosmos & Culture—NPR Blog (published electronically), 12 January 2016.

  26. 26.

    Paris Agreement, Article 2(1)(a).

  27. 27.

    Paris Agreement, Article 2(1)(a).

  28. 28.

    Paris Agreement, Article 21(1): ‘This Agreement shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date on which at least 55 Parties to the Convention accounting in total for at least an estimated 55% of the total global greenhouse gas emissions have deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession’.

  29. 29.

    A good account of this tilting of the scales towards bottom-up state-determined discretion is provided over pp. 321–323 in Sands, et al., supra, n. 22.

  30. 30.

    Inaugurated 20 January 2017.

  31. 31.

    S. Schiele, Evolution of International Environmental Regimes: The Case of Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014), p. 87. New Zealand is a further proportionally high-level emitter that supported the Paris Agreement after having agreed to targets under the first Kyoto Protocol period but rejecting them under the second period.

  32. 32.

    Although, as noted, the UK initially participated in the UNFCCC from a largely nested position within the EU, the UK was also party to the agreement in its own right, meaning that Brexit—the process of the UK leaving the EU—has no capacity to sever the UK’s status as a UNFCCC signatory. The same is true for the Paris Agreement; see further Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth, ‘The Paris Agreement proves that the Transition to a Climate-Neutral and Climate-Resilient World is Happening’, published speech transcript to the UN, delivered 22 April 2016, published 25 April 2016 (UK Government, 2016).

  33. 33.

    On the key features of the CCA, see further Chapter 2.

  34. 34.

    On the UK’s 2016 referendum to leave the EU, and the social, geographic and ideological dimensions underpinning the voting process, see M.J. Goodwin, O. Heath, ‘The 2016 Referendum, Brexit and the Left Behind: An Aggregate-Level Analysis of the Result’ 87(3) The Political Quarterly 323 (2016).

  35. 35.

    Good consideration of EU participation in the UNFCCC context is provided in S. Schunz, ‘The EU in the United Nations Climate Change Regime’, Chapter 10 in J. Wouters, H. Bruyninckx, S. Basu, S. Schunz (eds.) The European Union and Multilateral Governance: Assessing EU Participation in United Nations Human Rights and Environmental Fora (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2012).

  36. 36.

    S. Oberthur, C.R. Kelly, ‘EU Leadership in International Climate Policy: Achievements and Challenges’ 43(3) The International Spectator 35 (2008).

  37. 37.

    See further G. Boyle, Renewable Energy: Power for a Sustainable Future (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012).

  38. 38.

    It is to be noted that the vital issue of energy efficiency in EU environmental and energy studies tends to be generally under-represented. Good coverage is provided in J. Rosenow, F. Kern, ‘EU Energy Innovation Policy: The Curious Case of Energy Efficiency’, Chapter 28 (pp. 501–518) in R. Leal-Arcas, J. Wouters (eds.) Research Handbook on EU Energy Law and Policy (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2017).

  39. 39.

    Often described as the 2020 Climate and Energy Package, the 20-20-20 Targets/Goals, or similar.

  40. 40.

    See further: European Commission, A Roadmap for Moving to a Competitive Low Carbon Economy in 2050 (COM/2011/112); European Commission, Energy Roadmap 2050 (COM/2011/885); European Commission, A Policy Framework for Climate and Energy in the Period from 2020 to 2030 COM (2014) 15 final/2.

  41. 41.

    See further Chapter 1.

  42. 42.

    Council of the European Union, ‘Presidency Conclusions’, Brussels European Council 8/9 March 2007 7224/1/07 CONCL 1.

  43. 43.

    This became the date that the CCA’s ‘interim’ milestone target has been pegged to, applied at CCA, s.5(1)(a).

  44. 44.

    Council Directive 2009/29/EC [2009] OJ L140/63 (‘ETS Directive’).

  45. 45.

    Council Decision 406/2009/EC [2009] OJ L 140/136 (‘Effort Sharing Decision’); 16% reflects the UK-specific target at Annex II to the Decision.

  46. 46.

    Council Directive 2009/28/EC [2009] OJ L140/16 (‘Renewables Directive’).

  47. 47.

    Renewables Directive, ibid., Annex I.

  48. 48.

    Renewables Directive, ibid., Annex I.A.

  49. 49.

    Council Directive 2009/231/EC [2009] OJ L140/114 (‘CCS Directive’).

  50. 50.

    Council Directive 2002/91/EC [2002] OJ L1/65; Council Directive 2010/31/EU [2010] OJ L153/13; Council Directive 2006/32/EC [2006] OJ L114/64; Council Decision 1639/2006/EC [2006] OJ L 310/15; Council Directive 2009/125/EC [2009] OJ L285/10; Council Directive 2010/30/EC [2010] OJ 153/1.

  51. 51.

    Council Directive 2012/27/EU [2012] OJ L315/1 (‘Energy Efficiency Directive’).

  52. 52.

    See, e.g., B. Ward, ‘How Will Brexit Affect Climate Change Policy?’ News & Commentaries (published electronically, unpaginated; Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment) 30 June 2016.

  53. 53.

    S. Fankhauser, A. Averchenkova, J. Finnegan, 10 Years of the UK Climate Change Act (Grantham Research Institute and London School of Economics, 2018).

  54. 54.

    Fankhauser, Averchenkova, Finnegan, ibid., p. 3.

  55. 55.

    General interest in the CCA is reflected in media and associated coverage that the CCA has received outside the UK.

  56. 56.

    An example of ‘Strategic Policy Interest’ includes the ‘Outcome Document’ produced at the event ‘International Environmental Laws and Climate Change: Is there Global Climate Justice’, hosted 17–20 July 2017 by the Center for United Nations Constitutional Research (CUNCR). This outcome report, which forms a basis for UN-level lobbying work conducted by CUNCR, states that ‘Domestically, in passing the first rigorous climate change legislation in 2008, the UK has provided the world with a crucial opportunity to learn from its successes and failures—not least given its complex constitutional environment. The 2008 Climate Change Act is a useful model for how other States can implement legally binding targets to combat climate change’. See CUNCR, Is there Global Climate Justice?—Outcome Document (CUNCR, 2017).

  57. 57.

    CCC, ‘A Global Deal of National Climate Change Laws?’ published online at the CCC’s database, 23 June 2014, https://www.theccc.org.uk/2014/06/23/a-global-deal-of-national-climate-change-laws/.

  58. 58.

    Minister Per Boland, in conversation with the author over the course of research for this book, on the date of Friday 20 October 2017.

  59. 59.

    J. Lang, ‘Zero Time: NZ’s Zero Carbon Act’ E-nvironmentalist (published electronically, unpaginated) 18 September 2017.

  60. 60.

    See, e.g., M. Nachmany, S. Fankhauser, et al. The 2015 Global Climate Legislation Study: A Review of Climate Change Legislation in 99 Countries, Summary for Policy-Makers (Grantham Research Institute, GLOBE, IPU, 2015), p. 15.

  61. 61.

    IDLO, The New General Law on Climate Change in Mexico : Leading National Action to Transition to a Green Economy (IDLO, 2012), p. 1.

  62. 62.

    The New General Law on Climate Change in Mexico , ibid., p. 4 (emphasis added).

  63. 63.

    Stephen Minas (expert in international climate affairs), in conversation with the author over the course of research for this book, on the date of Wednesday 11 October 2017; see also S. Fankhauser, A. Averchenkova, Finnegan, supra, n. 53.

  64. 64.

    Climate Change (Management) Act 2015. See also Papua New Guinea Office of Climate Change and Development, Papua New Guinea’s Commitment to Act on Climate Change (Papua New Guinea Government, 2010). The author is grateful to Stephen Minas for highlighting Papua New Guinea’s circumstances over the course of research for this book.

  65. 65.

    The underpinning legislation was enacted in 1998, and the arrangements had become properly operational by 1999. However, unlike Northern Ireland and Scotland, in the case of Wales a fully developed executive Welsh government that was separate from the Welsh legislature was not created in law until 2006.

  66. 66.

    UK devolution was established by a range of Acts created by UK Parliament, most particularly the Northern Ireland Act 1998, the Scotland Act 1998 and the Government of Wales Act 1998. The devolved settlements have changed and evolved over time, with the changes being brought in by various legal amendments and additional Acts of UK Parliament. The Welsh arrangements were substantially adjusted in particular under the terms of the Government of Wales Act 2006 and the Wales Act 2017.

  67. 67.

    See further T.L. Muinzer, G. Ellis, ‘Subnational Governance for the Low Carbon Energy Transition: Mapping the UK’s “Energy Constitution”’ 35(7) Environment and Planning C 1176 (2017).

  68. 68.

    For a discussion of the single jurisdiction circumstance in the light of certain comments on the subject from the First Minister of Wales, see M. Navarro, ‘A Substantial Body of Different Welsh Law: A Consideration of Welsh Subordinate Legislation’ 33(2) Statute Law Review 163 (2012).

  69. 69.

    An accessible discussion of issues raised by these ‘England and Wales’ jurisdictional circumstances can be read in R. Owen, ‘Should Wales Separate from England’s Legal System’, The Conversation (published electronically, unpaginated) 12 April 2016.

  70. 70.

    See further: D. Lambert, ‘The Government of Wales Act—An Act for Laws to Be Ministered in Wales in Like Form as It Is in This Realm?’ 30 Cambrian Law Review 60 (1999); M. Laffin, A. Thomas, ‘Designing the National Assembly for Wales’ 53(3) Parliamentary Affairs 557 (2000).

  71. 71.

    R. Owen, ‘Government of Wales Act 2006’ 42(1) The Law Teacher 103 (2008).

  72. 72.

    A. Trench, ‘The Government of Wales Act 2006: The Next Steps on Devolution for Wales’ Public Law 687 (2006).

  73. 73.

    See GoWA 2006, Schedule 7, Subjects 1–20. Further significant amendments have since been made to the Welsh legislation by the Wales Act 2017.

  74. 74.

    See further the analysis of the Welsh powers across T.L. Muinzer and G. Ellis, supra, n. 67. See also R. Cowell, ‘Decentralising Energy Governance? Wales, Devolution and the Politics of Energy Infrastructure Decision-Making’ 35(7) Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space 1242 (2017).

  75. 75.

    GoWA 2006, Schedule 7 Part 1. ‘Fields’ wherein the Welsh Assembly has been able to make law were established at GoWA 2006, Schedule 5, and GoWA 2006, s.108 limited these to a range of subjects stated at GoWA 2006, Schedule 7. Additional limits described as ‘exceptions’ within Schedule 7 were placed on certain subsidiary aspects of the subjects. See also the Wales Act 2017, where further significant adjustments to the governance structure of the Welsh framework have been introduced.

  76. 76.

    Welsh Assembly Government, Climate Change Strategy for Wales (WAG, 2010), p. 34.

  77. 77.

    See Welsh Assembly Government, Energy Wales: A Low Carbon Transition (WAG, 2012).

  78. 78.

    The legislation affords special recognition to redressing problems posed by climate change, see, e.g., Well-Being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015, s.4, Table 1, Goals one and two. Elements of the CCA are also explicitly recognised at s.11(2)(b) and s.38(3)(a).

  79. 79.

    Environment (Wales) Act 2016, Part 2, ‘Climate Change’.

  80. 80.

    Environment (Wales) Act 2016, s.30, s.32.

  81. 81.

    Environment (Wales) Act 2016, s.31, s.32.

  82. 82.

    Environment (Wales) Act 2016, s.28.

  83. 83.

    Environment (Wales) Act 2016, s.28.

  84. 84.

    The Environment (Wales) Act 2016 also devotes a major section to the absorption of CCA-driven carrier bags charges (discussed in the preceding chapter); see Environment (Wales) Act 2016 Part 3 (‘Charges for Carrier Bags’) and Schedule 2 Part 2.

  85. 85.

    See Northern Ireland Executive, Programme for Government 2011–15 (NIE, 2011). At the time of writing, the Northern Irish government has collapsed, and this has delayed the finalisation and implementation of a subsequent Programme for Government. Ironically, the government’s collapse was chiefly precipitated by climate and energy-specific issues, relating to the Democratic Unionist Party’s alleged mismanagement of financial incentives for renewable heat (the Renewable Heat Incentive); see further T.L. Muinzer, ‘Incendiary Developments: Northern Ireland’s Renewable Heat Incentive, and the Collapse of the Devolved Government’, (99) March/April UKELA E-Law 18 (2017). The draft version of the next Programme for Government gives no indication that a more robust approach will be taken to climate and energy mitigation and adaptation in the event that the devolved government is restored.

  86. 86.

    CCA, s.5(1)(a).

  87. 87.

    See, e.g., G. Ellis, R. Cowell, F. Sherry-Brennan, P. Strachan, D. Toke, Delivering Renewable Energy Under Devolution : Initial Findings Summary Report (DREUD, 2013), p. 6.

  88. 88.

    See Muinzer’s commentary on the tension between the fairly extensive capacities to take action in the area of climate and energy governance enjoyed by Northern Ireland under the devolution arrangements, and the fundamental lack of progressive governance action that the devolved administration has exhibited in practice: T.L. Muinzer, ‘Warming Up: Northern Ireland’s Developing Response to Climate Change in the Context of UK Devolution’, (96) (September/October) UKELA E-Law 19 (2016); Muinzer, ‘Incendiary Developments’, supra, n. 85.

  89. 89.

    DEFRA, Agriculture in the United Kingdom 2016 (HM Government, 2017), p. 21.

  90. 90.

    CCC, The Appropriateness of a Northern Ireland Climate Change Act—December 2015 Update (CCC, 2015).

  91. 91.

    See D. McKittrick, D. McVea, Making Sense of the Troubles (New Amsterdam Books, USA, 2002).

  92. 92.

    See, for example, the support offered by the Royal Town Planning Institute Northern Ireland (RTPINI) in Pre-consultation Seeking Views on the Need for a Northern Ireland Climate Change Bill : A Response by the Royal Town Planning Institute Northern Ireland (RTPINI, 2013).

  93. 93.

    CCC, The Appropriateness of a Northern Ireland Climate Change Act (CCC, 2011), pp. 18–19.

  94. 94.

    Alex Atwood MLA (Minister for Environment, May 2011–July 2013); see, e.g., M. McKimm, ‘Northern Ireland “Should Do More over Carbon Emissions”’, BBC News, 8 November 2011. Atwood’s successor, Mark H. Durkan MLA (Minister for Environment, July 2013–March 2016), was also sympathetic to this view, describing Northern Ireland’s inability to reach political consensus in order to legislate in this area as an ‘embarrassment’ to Northern Ireland’s devolved Parliament; see ‘‘Environment Minister Rules Out Separate Climate Change Laws’, Belfast Telegraph (UK Newspaper), 5 December 2016.

  95. 95.

    See DOE, Synopsis of Responses to the Department’s Pre-consultation Seeking Views on the Need for a Northern Ireland Climate Change Bill , (DOE, 2013). Here, it is recorded that 64% of respondents favoured the creation of a Climate Change Bill for Northern Ireland, 24% were against the Bill, and 12% did not express a preference (p. 7).

  96. 96.

    S. Turner, ‘Northern Ireland’s Consent to the Climate Change Act 2008: Symbol or Illusion?’ 25(1) Journal of Environmental Law 63 (2013), p. 63. See also S. Turner, ‘Committing to Effective Climate Governance in Northern Ireland: A Defining Test of Devolution’ 25(2) Journal of Environmental Law 203 (2013).

  97. 97.

    Turner, ibid., ‘Northern Ireland’s Consent to the Climate Change Act 2008’, p. 63.

  98. 98.

    It is also noteworthy that it is possibly the case under constitutional law that national decarbonisation targets cannot be set without consultation with the Scottish Ministers having first taken place; see the Scotland Act 1998, s.106(4).

  99. 99.

    See, e.g., Scottish Government (press release), ‘Leading the Way on Climate Change’, 10 November 2017.

  100. 100.

    See, for example, Turner’s discussion of the CCA, who considers Scotland to be an exemplary leader (in contrast to a comparatively recalcitrant Northern Ireland); Turner, supra, n. 96, ‘Northern Ireland’s Consent to the Climate Change Act 2008’, p. 65.

  101. 101.

    National Records of Scotland, Mid-2016 Population Estimates Scotland (Scottish Government, 2017).

  102. 102.

    Office for National Statistics, Overview of the UK Population: July 2017 (ONS, 2017), p. 2.

  103. 103.

    Scottish Government, ‘Energy in Scotland: Get the Facts’ (hosted at the Scottish Government’s online database), http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Business-Industry/Energy/Facts (Based on readings for 2015).

  104. 104.

    See, for example, the rhetoric underpinning the Scottish Government’s ‘Greener Scotland’ website, http://www.greenerscotland.org.

  105. 105.

    See further M. Peeters, M. Stallworthy, J. de Cendra de Larragán (eds.) Climate Law in EU Member States : Towards National Legislation for Climate Protection (Edward Elgar, 2012), in particular Chapter 7 (examining Scotland).

  106. 106.

    As discussed in the preceding section of this Chapter.

  107. 107.

    MtCO2e is a technical measurement meaning ‘million tonnes carbon dioxide equivalent’. The MtCO2e reading quantifies the gases defined as ‘greenhouse gases’ under the Climate Change Acts.

  108. 108.

    See Scottish Government, Scottish Greenhouse Gas Emissions 2015 (Scottish Government, 2015), p. 2.

  109. 109.

    CCC, Reducing Emissions in Scotland : 2017 Progress Report to Parliament (CCC, 2017), p. 7. The reason that 2015 readings are being used for reporting in 2017 is that emissions reporting is subject to a substantial time-lag due to the breadth and complexity of the data that must be gathered and processed.

  110. 110.

    See, e.g., H.V. Campbell, ‘A Rising Tide: Wave Energy in the United States and Scotland’ 2(2) Sea Grant Law and Policy Journal 29 (Winter 2009/2010). Jackson and Lynch have emphasised that the Scottish legislation imposes some of the most demanding legal requirements found not just in the UK, but anywhere in the world, see T. Jackson, W. Lynch, ‘Public Sector Responses to Climate Change: Evaluating the Role of Scottish Local Government in Implementing the Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009’ 8/9 Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance 112 (2011), p. 112.

  111. 111.

    Supra, n. 109, and text to note.

  112. 112.

    CC(S)A, s.2(1).

  113. 113.

    See further Chapter 1.

  114. 114.

    See further Scottish Government, Proposals for a New Climate Change Bill : Strategic Environmental Assessment Environmental Report (Scottish Government, 2017), and the Climate Change (Emissions Reduction Targets) (Scotland) Bill.

  115. 115.

    See further T.L. Muinzer, supra, n. 88.

  116. 116.

    ‘Foreword by the First Minister’, in Scottish Government, A Nation with Ambition: The Government’s Programme for Scotland 2017–18 (Scottish Government, 2017), p. 3.

  117. 117.

    CC(S)A, s.1(1), s.2(1).

  118. 118.

    CC(S)A, s.2(1).

  119. 119.

    CC(S)A, s.4(2).

  120. 120.

    CC(S)A, ss.3–4.

  121. 121.

    See CC(S)A, ss.3–7.

  122. 122.

    CC(S)A, s.4(1). In Scotland’s subnational governance setting, these sorts of Orders are commonly viewed as a type of ‘secondary’ legislation, that enables the Scottish Ministers (in this case) to exercise powers provided for under primary legislation (here, the CC(S)A). For further detail on the power to create Orders under the CC(S)A, and also the power to create regulations under the Act, see CC(S)A, s.96 ‘Subordinate legislation’.

  123. 123.

    CC(S)A, s.9(1)(a)(i)–(iii).

  124. 124.

    Ecologic Institute, “Paris Compatible” Governance: Long-Term Policy Frameworks to drive Transformational Change (Ecologic Institute, 2017), p. 72.

  125. 125.

    See CC(S)A, s.91, ‘Public engagement’.

  126. 126.

    CC(S)A, s.91, ‘Public engagement’.

  127. 127.

    CC(S)A, Part 1.

  128. 128.

    CC(S)A, Part 2.

  129. 129.

    CC(S)A, Part 3.

  130. 130.

    CC(S)A, Part 4.

  131. 131.

    CC(S)A, Part 5.

  132. 132.

    CC(S)A, ‘Adaptation’, ss.53–56.

  133. 133.

    CC(S)A, s.53(2)(a)(i)–(v).

  134. 134.

    CC(S)A, s.53(2)(b).

  135. 135.

    CC(S)A, s.10(1)(a)–(f).

  136. 136.

    CC(S)A, s.10(1)(g). This new addition is given a baseline year of 1995; CC(S)A, s.11(2)(f). Wales has also incorporated this gas into its legislation, see Environment (Wales) Act 2016, s.37(1)(g).

  137. 137.

    Specifically, the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, as outlined in Chapter 2.

  138. 138.

    See further Chapter 2.

  139. 139.

    CC(S)A, s.25.

  140. 140.

    CCA, Schedule 1, ‘The Committee on Climate Change’.

  141. 141.

    CC(S)A, s.33.

  142. 142.

    CC(S)A, s.36(2).

  143. 143.

    C.T. Reid, ‘Climate Law: Scotland’, response issued to the rapporteur for the United Nations Climate Change Conference COP 15.

  144. 144.

    See further the discussion of judicial review and sanctions in Chapter 1.

  145. 145.

    See further Reid’s consideration of the Scottish experience in: C.T. Reid, ‘A New Sort of Duty? The Significance of “Outcome” Duties in the Climate Change and Child Poverty Acts’ 4 Public Law 749 (2012); C.T. Reid, ‘Scotland: Constraints and Opportunities in a Devolved System’ in M. Peeters, M. Stallworthy, J.C. de Larragán (eds.) Climate Law in EU Member States : Towards National Legislation for Climate Protection (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2012).

  146. 146.

    CC(S)A, Schedule 1, Schedule 2.

  147. 147.

    CC(S)A, Schedule 1A, ‘FIXED PENALTIES’ (these letters appear as capitals in the Act). See also CC(S)A, s.88A, ‘Carrier bag offences: fixed penalty notices’.

  148. 148.

    See further the examination of the CCA’s provisions in Chapter 2, including carrier bag charges. The Scottish equivalent of those charges is enabled at CC(S)A, s.88.

  149. 149.

    The devolved energy powers across the UK’s subnational jurisdictions, including Scotland, are mapped out in Muinzer and Ellis, supra, n. 67. See further G. Little, ‘Energy and the Scotland Act 2016’ 20(3) Edinburgh Law Review 394 (2016).

  150. 150.

    See Muinzer and Ellis, ibid.

  151. 151.

    CC(S)A, ss.60–74. Energy efficiency also surfaces as a significant theme at other important points in the framework, see, e.g., CC(S)A, s.76(1)(a).

  152. 152.

    CC(S)A, s.60, s.61.

  153. 153.

    CC(S)A, s.65 (substantially amending the Local Government Finance Act 1992).

  154. 154.

    See CC(S)A, Part 4.

  155. 155.

    CC(S)A, s.57, ‘Duty to produce a land use strategy’. See also CC(S)A, ss.84–87, which enable the creation of a ‘deposit and return’ scheme intended to improve recycling. See further Chapter 2 on waste reduction under the CCA.

  156. 156.

    CC(S)A, s.57(6).

  157. 157.

    CC(S)A, s.58. The time variation is applied through amendment by the CC(S)A to the Hill Farming Act 1946.

  158. 158.

    Oxford English Dictionary (Online), ‘moorburn, n.’ Unpaginated resource.

  159. 159.

    The author is grateful to Sir Crispin Agnew QC (senior Scottish advocate) for drawing attention to these circumstances over the course of research for this book.

  160. 160.

    Wildland Ltd and the Welbeck Estates v Scottish Ministers [2017] CSOH 113.

  161. 161.

    Ibid., para [1].

  162. 162.

    Similarly, for acknowledgement of the macro-role of the CC(S)A in relation to: the narrower issue of planning permission for housebuilding and an associated purported risk of flooding, see Bova v Highland Council [2013] SC 510, para [54]; an obligation to transition to renewable energy, see Packard, Petitioner [2011] CSOH 93, Para [19].

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    Thomas L. Muinzer

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Muinzer, T.L. (2019). Multilevel Drivers: The International Level and the Devolved Level (Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales). In: Climate and Energy Governance for the UK Low Carbon Transition. Palgrave Pivot, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94670-2_3

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