Advertisement

A New Method for Sharing the Public Keys in Opportunistic Networks

  • Samaneh Rashidibajgan
  • Robin Doss
Conference paper
Part of the Communications in Computer and Information Science book series (CCIS, volume 878)

Abstract

Opportunistic Networks do not have a fundamental infrastructure, and different nodes in these networks have the role of a sender, receiver and a router. Intermediate nodes should route messages to neighbors and they should extract sufficient information for this purpose while the content of the message is still hidden. In order to achieve this aim, messages should be encrypted. While there is not a constant path between two specific nodes in OppNet, it is not possible to use traditional solutions such as a trusted third party for sharing the public key. In this paper, a new confidentiality structure is proposed in order to encrypt the messages and sharing nodes’ public key in Opportunistic Networks. By this new structure, intermediate nodes may route messages while they are not able to extract payload of a message.

Keywords

Opportunistic networks Key management Messages encryption 

References

  1. 1.
    Farrell, S., Cahill, V., Geraghty, D., Humphreys, I., McDonald, P.: When TCP breaks: delay-and disruption-tolerant networking. IEEE Internet Comput. 10(4), 72–78 (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. 2.
    Juang, P., Oki, H., Wang, Y., Martonosi, M., Peh, L.S., Rubenstein, D.: Energy-efficient computing for wildlife tracking: design tradeoffs and early experiences with zebranet. ACM SIGARCH Comput. Archit. News 30(5), 96–107 (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. 3.
    Huang, J.-H., Amjad, S., Mishra, S.: CenWits: a sensor-based loosely coupled search and rescue system using witnesses, pp. 180–191 (2005)Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Detweiller, C., Vasilescu, I., Rus, D.: An underwater sensor network with dual communications, sensing, and mobility, pp. 1–6 (2007)Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Shikfa, A., Onen, M., Molva, R.: Privacy in content-based opportunistic networks, pp. 832–837 (2009)Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Shikfa, A., Önen, M., Molva, R.: Privacy in context-based and epidemic forwarding, pp. 1–7 (2009)Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Hegland, A.M., Winjum, E., Mjolsnes, S.F., Rong, C., Kure, O., Spilling, P.: A survey of key management in ad hoc networks. IEEE Commun. Surv. Tutor. 8(3), 48–66 (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. 8.
    Attar, A., Tang, H., Vasilakos, A.V., Yu, F.R., Leung, V.C.: A survey of security challenges in cognitive radio networks: solutions and future research directions. Proc. IEEE 100(12), 3172–3186 (2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. 9.
    Memarmoshrefi, P., Seibel, R., Hogrefe, D.: Autonomous ant-based public key authentication mechanism for mobile ad-hoc networks. Mob. Netw. Appl. 21(1), 149–160 (2016)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. 10.
    Le, Z., Vakde, G., Wright, M.: PEON: privacy-enhanced opportunistic networks with applications in assistive environments. In: 2nd International Conference on Pervasive Technologies Related to Assistive Environments, pp. 76–83 (2009)Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Cabaniss, R., Kumar, V., Madria, S.: Multi-party encryption (MPE): secure communications in delay tolerant networks. Wirel. Netw. 21(4), 1243–1258 (2015)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. 12.
    Palmieri, P., Pouwelse, J.: Key management for onion routing in a true peer to peer setting. In: Yoshida, M., Mouri, K. (eds.) IWSEC 2014. LNCS, vol. 8639, pp. 62–71. Springer, Cham (2014).  https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-09843-2_5CrossRefMATHGoogle Scholar
  13. 13.
    Sakai, K., Sun, M.-T., Ku, W.-S., Wu, J., Alanazi, F.S.: Performance and security analyses of onion-based anonymous routing for delay tolerant networks. IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput. 16(12), 3473–3487 (2017)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. 14.
    de Diogo, A., Albini, L.C.P.: Fully distributed public key management through digital signature chains for delay and disrupt tolerant networks. In: 13th International Conference on Mobile Ad Hoc and Sensor Systems, pp. 316–324 (2016)Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    Rashidibajgan, S.: A trust structure for detection of sybil attacks in opportunistic networks, pp. 347–351 (2016)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Rostock UniversityRostockGermany
  2. 2.Deakin University, Melbourne Burwood CampusBurwoodAustralia

Personalised recommendations