Advertisement

Rationality, Irrationality, Realism and the Good

  • Paul Dumouchel
Chapter

Abstract

After reviewing rapidly the transformation of the concept of irrationality in its relation to our changing concept of rationality, this chapter argues that, given the normative dimension of rationality, even the most basic forms of rationality implies a conception of the good.

References

  1. Allen, C., & Bekoff, M. (1999). Species of mind the philosophy and biology of cognitive ethology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  2. Bimbenet, E. (2015). L’invention du réalisme. Paris: Les éditions du Cerf.Google Scholar
  3. Boyer, A. (1992). L’Explication en histoire. Presses Universitaires de Lille.Google Scholar
  4. Broom, J. (1990). Should a rational agent maximize expected utility. In K. S. Cook & M. Levi (Eds.), The limits of rationality (pp. 132–145). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
  5. Davidson, D. (1970). How is weakness of the will possible? In Essays on actions and events (pp. 21–42). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980.Google Scholar
  6. Davidson, D. (1986). Inquiries into truth and interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  7. Derriennic, J. P. (2001). Les Guerres civiles. Paris: Les presses de la fondation nationales des sciences politiques.Google Scholar
  8. Descombes, V. (1995). La denrée mentale. Paris: Minuit.Google Scholar
  9. de Souza, R. (2007). Why think? Evolution and the rational mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  10. Dumouchel, P. (2005). Rational Deception. In C. Gerschlager (Ed.), Deception in markets (pp. 51–73). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.Google Scholar
  11. Faust, D. (1984). The limits of scientific reasoning. Minneapolis: Universit of Minnesota Press.Google Scholar
  12. Frank, R. H. (1988). Passions within reason. New York: W.W. Northon.Google Scholar
  13. Friedman, M. (1953). The methodology of positive economics. In essays in positive economics (pp. 3–43). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
  14. Gigerenzer, G., & Selten, R. (Eds.). (2001). Bounded rationality the adaptive toolbox. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  15. Gigerenzer, G., Hertwig, R., & Pachur, T. (Eds.). (2011). Heuristics: The foundation of adaptive behavior. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  16. Glimcher, P. (2003). Decision, uncertainty and the brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  17. Hammerstein, P. (Ed.). (2003). Genetic and cultural evolution of cooperation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  18. Hampton, J. (1998). The authority of reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Hardin, R. (1995). One for all the logic of group conflict. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  20. Hare, R. (1963). Reason and freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  21. Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking fast and slow. London: Penguin Books.Google Scholar
  22. Lagueux, M. (1996). How could anyone be irrational. In M. Marion & R. S. Cohen (Eds.), Québec studies in the philosophy of science II (pp. 177–192). Dordecht: Kluwer Academic Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Lagueux, M. (2010). Rationality and explanation in economics. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
  24. Lurz, R. W. (2009). The philosophy of animal minds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. Maynard-Smith, J. (1982). Evolution and the theory of games. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Mele, A. (1987). Irrationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  27. Ogien, R. (1993). La faiblesse de la volonté. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Popper, K. (1967). «La rationalité et le statut du principe de rationalité». In E. Classen (Ed.) Les fondements philosophiques des doctrines économiques (pp. 142–150), Paris: Payot.Google Scholar
  29. Pugmire, D. (1982). Motivated irrationality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 56, 179–196.Google Scholar
  30. Ross, D. (2005). Economic theory and cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  31. Stich, S. P. (1990). The fragmentation of reason. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  32. Stigler, G. J., & Becker, G. (1977). De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum. The American Economic Review, 67(2), 76–90.Google Scholar
  33. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1986). Rational choice and the framing of decisions. Journal of Business, 54(4), 251–278.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. Uexküll, J. V. (1956). Mondes animaux et monde humain. Paris: Denoël.Google Scholar
  35. Vauclair, J. (1995). L’intelligence animale. Paris: Seuil.Google Scholar
  36. von Mises, L. (1944). The treatment of ‘irrationality’ in social sciences. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 4(3), 544–559.Google Scholar
  37. Watson, G. (1977). Skepticism about weakness of the will. Philosophical Review, 86, 316–339.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Graduate School of Core Ethics and Frontier SciencesRitsumeikan UniversityKyotoJapan

Personalised recommendations