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Social Design pp 157-171 | Cite as

Second Thoughts of Social Dilemma in Mechanism Design

  • Tatsuyoshi Saijo
Chapter
Part of the Studies in Economic Design book series (DESI)

Abstract

This paper shows that second thoughts are not an innocent device in our daily life, but it is human wisdom that plays an important role in resolving problems such as social dilemmas. We design a simple mechanism to achieve Pareto efficiency in social dilemmas and then compare the performance of this mechanism with and without second thoughts. First, second thoughts change the payoff structure of the game in favor of cooperation. Second, this mechanism is robust even when players deviate from a payoff maximizing behavior.

Keywords

Second thoughts Subgame perfection Social dilemma Cooperation Mechanism design 

JEL Classification

C72 C92 D74 

Notes

Acknowledgments

The author thanks Yoshitaka Oakano for his helpful comments and suggestions. This research was supported by Scientific Research A (24243028 and 17H00980) and Challenging Exploratory Research (16K13354) of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science; the Research Institute for Humanity and Nature (RIHN Project Number 14200122); and “Experimental Social Sciences: Toward Experimentally-based New Social Sciences for the 21st Century,” a project funded by a Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research on Priority Areas from the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture of Japan.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Tatsuyoshi Saijo
    • 1
    • 2
    • 3
  1. 1.Research Institute for Humanity and NatureKyotoJapan
  2. 2.Research Institute for Future DesignKochi University of TechnologyEikokujiJapan
  3. 3.Tokyo Foundation of Policy ResearchRoppongiJapan

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