Final Conclusions

  • Yazhuo Zheng
  • Kent Deng
Part of the Palgrave Studies in Economic History book series (PEHS)


In this chapter, we attempt to define ‘state failure’ and make some concluding remarks. In our opinion, the term ‘state failure’ here means that despite the range of state efforts to generate more GDP via urbanisation, both China’s market sector and macroeconomic structure have been severely distorted. As a result, the economy is facing a major crisis stemming from its unprecedented and self-inflicted financial difficulties. China’s recent miracle growth has not been value-free or crisis-exemptible. Instead, the growth has been a result of a wide range of distortions regarding resource allocation, macroeconomic structure , production capacity and income distribution.


Post-Mao communist leadership Maoist recession Deregulation Vested interest group Export market Distortion Proletarian Investment-intensive growth Overinvestment Overproduction Legitimacy Corruption 


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yazhuo Zheng
    • 1
  • Kent Deng
    • 2
  1. 1.Beijing Enlightenment Institute for Economic and Social ResearchBeijingChina
  2. 2.London School of EconomicsLondonUK

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