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The Central Government and Its Goals

  • Yazhuo Zheng
  • Kent Deng
Chapter
Part of the Palgrave Studies in Economic History book series (PEHS)

Abstract

In this chapter, we try to reveal the behavioural pattern and hidden incentives of the central government, to help people know why the central government has made such industrial policies as well as social policies, for example, fiscal centralisation policy, discrimination policy against rural immigrants and urbanisation policy in favour of provincial urban development on a small scale.

Keywords

Agrarian industrialisation Maoist economy Hukou system Democracy Industrialisation within a village 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yazhuo Zheng
    • 1
  • Kent Deng
    • 2
  1. 1.Beijing Enlightenment Institute for Economic and Social ResearchBeijingChina
  2. 2.London School of EconomicsLondonUK

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