Game Theory as Decision-Making Tool in Conventional and Nonconventional Events

  • Alba Iannotti
  • Riccardo Rossi
  • Andrea Malizia
Conference paper


Nowadays, safety and security are two objectives always harder to achieve and manage. International and national politics and economics are complexes, and any decisions must be taken considering all the possible consequences, penalties and advantages. Furthermore, these consequences are usually functions of how the others behave. Therefore, the development of tools, methods and theories able to help decision-makers is needed. Game theory is a mathematical science used in economic, political, psychological and scientific problematics. It is based on a mathematical model that takes into account all the possible interactions and decisions which each “player” could take in considerations. This work shows how game theory can be applied also in conventional and nonconventional events, considering some example of safety and security problematics and analysing advantages and limits of this tool.


Game theory Chemical weapon agents Decision tool 


  1. 1.
    Heyer, R.J.: Introduction to CBRNE Terrorism: An Awareness Primer and Preparedness Guide for Emergency Responders. The Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Response Association, Longmont (2006)Google Scholar
  2. 2.
  3. 3.
    Rebera, A.P., Rafalowski, C.: On the spot ethical decision-making in CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear event) response: approaches to on the spot ethical decision-making for first responders to large-scale chemical incidents. Sci. Eng. Ethics. 20(3), 735–752 (2014)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    Health Protection Agency: CBRN Incidents: Clinical Management and Health Protection (2008)Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    NATO: Guidelines for First Responders to a CBRN Incident (2014)Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Osborne, M.J.: An Introduction to Game Theory. Oxford University Press, Toronto (2000)Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Morrow, J.D.: Game Theory for Political Scientists. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ (1994)Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Nisan, N., Roughgarden, T., Tardos, E., Vazirani, V.V.: Algorithm Game Theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. 9.
    Rapoport, A., Chammah, A.M.: Prisoner’s Dilemma – A Study in Conflict and Cooperation. The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI (1965)Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Blake, J., Mahmud, A.: A legal “red line?” Syria and the use of chemical weapons in civil conflict. UCLA L. Rev. Disc. 61, 244–260 (2013)Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), [Online].
  12. 12.
    Swati, B.: Syrian civil war and the chemical weapons use. J. Chem. Biol. Weapons. 6(1–2), 13–15 (2013)Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Iannotti, A., Schraffl, I., Bellecci, C., Malizia, A., Cenciarelli, O., Di Giovanni, D., Palombi, L., Gaudio, P.: Weapons of mass destruction: a review of its use in history to perpetrate chemical offenses. Def. S&T Tech. Bull. 9(1), 39–52 (2016)Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    Iannotti, A., Schraffl, I., Bellecci, C., Gaudio, P., Palombi, L., Cenciarelli, O., Di Giovanni, D., Carestia, M., Malizia, A.: Chemical weapons convention and its application against the use of chemical warfare agents. Def. S&T Tech. Bull. 9(2), 110–125 (2016)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.HESARRomeItaly
  2. 2.Department of Industrial EngineeringUniversity of Rome “Tor Vergata”RomeItaly
  3. 3.Department of Biomedicine and PreventionUniversity of Rome “Tor Vergata”RomeItaly

Personalised recommendations