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The Republic of Science and Its Constitution: Some Reflections on Scientific Methods as Institutions

  • Jesús Zamora Bonilla
Chapter

Abstract

Jarvie’s Popper’s social view of science from Logik der Forschung to The Open Society and Its Enemies is used to discuss whether the “proto-constitution” of science that, according to Jarvie, Popper formulated is a sound justification of a falsificationist methodology, and whether the view of society and of social science grounding Popper’s views could be substituted for some more updated insights from contemporary social science. In particular, I defend that a game-theoretic view to the choice of norms, one that takes into account the large variety of real goals and real agents having some role in the scientific process, would be a more appropriate approach to understand the “constitution of science.”

Notes

Acknowledgements

The author thanks Spain’s government research projects PRX14-00007 and FFI2014-57258-P.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of PhilosophyUNED, National Distance Education UniversityMadridSpain

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