A Miscellany of Objections

  • Gerald K. Harrison
Part of the Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion book series (PFPR)


I consider a wide variety of objections, including concerns about regresses, authority, ontological extravagance, and supposed threats to normative theorizing. In all cases the objections are shown either to be misguided or question begging.


  1. Adams, R. (1999). Finite and infinite goods. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  2. Bennett, J. (1971). Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central themes. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
  3. Finlay, S. (2010). Recent work on normativity. Analysis, 70(2), 331–346.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Scanlon, T. (2003). Metaphysics and morals. Proceedings and Addreses of the American Philosophical Association, 77, 7–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Turri, J. (2009). The ontology of epistemic reasons. Noûs, 43(3), 490–512.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Williams, B. (1981). Moral luck: Philosophical papers 1973–1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gerald K. Harrison
    • 1
  1. 1.Massey UniversityPalmerston NorthNew Zealand

Personalised recommendations