• Gerald K. Harrison
Part of the Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion book series (PFPR)


The divine psychologism defended in this work can be used to make a large number of predictions about the character of the normative aspect to reality. For instance—and without making any substantial normative assumptions—it is possible to predict the existence of epistemic, instrumental and moral reasons of approximately the kind there appear to be. Additionally, the existence of something answering to our concept of moral desert can also be anticipated, as can the existence of strong links between what we are motivated to do and what we have normative reason to do. Finally, though not exhaustively, we can predict that the content of the normative aspect to reality will vary to some degree over time. All of these predictions appear to be confirmed.


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gerald K. Harrison
    • 1
  1. 1.Massey UniversityPalmerston NorthNew Zealand

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