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Euthyphro

  • Gerald K. Harrison
Chapter
Part of the Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion book series (PFPR)

Abstract

Euthyphro-style objections to divine analyses of normative concepts (and to date such analyses have been almost exclusively of moral concepts) are thought by most contemporary philosophers to refute them. Nothing could be further from the truth. Such objections—and I identify four distinct ones—fail to raise any reasonable doubt about the truth of the view defended in this work. They all either mistaken or else beg the question by interpreting relevant rational intuitions descriptively, when in fact it would be reasonable to interpret them expressively if they are communications from a god. Furthermore, all such objections apply to rival analyses, but in their case the relevant theories—unlike my theory—lack the resources to be able to deal with them. Far from refuting divine psychologism Euthyphro-style objections challenge rival analyses.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gerald K. Harrison
    • 1
  1. 1.Massey UniversityPalmerston NorthNew Zealand

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