Mente Divina

  • Gerald K. Harrison
Part of the Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion book series (PFPR)


Our faculties of reason are not faculties of perception. They are best characterized as kinds of instruction manual on reality that provide us, via rational intuitions, with indirect information about what Reason favours us doing and being. As normative reasons exist indubitably, and as we are indubitably normatively aware, it follows that Reason exists and is the author of our instruction manuals. Given we are almost inescapably bound to consult our faculties of reason, Reason has considerable influence over us and thereby qualifies as some kind of a god or divine mind. To avoid the temptation to bloat my conclusion and attribute to Reason qualities that my arguments have not licensed, I adopt Samuel Johnson’s term and refer to her as a mente divina and the theory as divine psychologism.


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gerald K. Harrison
    • 1
  1. 1.Massey UniversityPalmerston NorthNew Zealand

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