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Conclusion

  • Gerald K. Harrison
Chapter
Part of the Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion book series (PFPR)

Abstract

I summarize the main argument developed in this work and the fifteen arguments I gave in support of its premises. I go on to describe how the contemporary debate can be said to be characterized by some classic symptoms of normative autism or mind-blindness, ranging from a failure to register the mental import of the terms it deploys to literalism where rational intuitions are concerned. Finally, I describe my own journey from mind-blindness to mind-sight where Reason is concerned.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gerald K. Harrison
    • 1
  1. 1.Massey UniversityPalmerston NorthNew Zealand

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