The question is “what are normative reasons, in and of themselves?” The answer is going to be that they are the attitudes a single external mind—a god of sorts—is adopting towards us doing and believing things. However, it is emphasized that what follows is not an attempt to provide rational underpinnings to a religious worldview, but a disinterested attempt to follow arguments where they lead. The following are also clarified: (a) that the question is not about what we have reason to do and believe (a first-order question), but about what the reasons themselves are made of (a second order question); (b) that normative reasons should not be conflated with explanatory reasons and/or motivational reasons; and finally (c) that there are three main kinds of normative reason: epistemic, instrumental and moral.
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