Advertisement

The Question

  • Gerald K. Harrison
Chapter
Part of the Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion book series (PFPR)

Abstract

The question is “what are normative reasons, in and of themselves?” The answer is going to be that they are the attitudes a single external mind—a god of sorts—is adopting towards us doing and believing things. However, it is emphasized that what follows is not an attempt to provide rational underpinnings to a religious worldview, but a disinterested attempt to follow arguments where they lead. The following are also clarified: (a) that the question is not about what we have reason to do and believe (a first-order question), but about what the reasons themselves are made of (a second order question); (b) that normative reasons should not be conflated with explanatory reasons and/or motivational reasons; and finally (c) that there are three main kinds of normative reason: epistemic, instrumental and moral.

References

  1. Brink, D. O. (1997). Kantian rationalism: Inescapability, authority, and supremacy. In G. Cullity & B. Gaut (Eds.), Ethics and practical reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  2. Craig, W. L., & Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2003). God?: A debate between a Christian and an atheist. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  3. Double, R. (1996). Metaphilosophy and free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  4. Heuer, U. (2004). Reasons for action and desires. Philosophical Studies, 121(1), 43–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Huemer, M. (2005). Ethical intuitionism. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.Google Scholar
  6. Mantel, S. (2015). Worldly reasons: An ontological inquiry into motivating considerations and normative reasons. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 98(1), 5–28.Google Scholar
  7. Turri, J. (2009). The ontology of epistemic reasons. Noûs, 43(3), 490–512.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Velleman, D. (2004). Replies to discussion on the possibility of practical reason. Philosophical Studies, 121(3), 277–298.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gerald K. Harrison
    • 1
  1. 1.Massey UniversityPalmerston NorthNew Zealand

Personalised recommendations