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The Drawer of Committees

  • Hirokazu Kikuchi
Chapter
Part of the IDE-JETRO Series book series (IDE)

Abstract

It is a unique chapter for explaining committee behavior. Taking advantage of an in-depth case study on the 2005 anti-smoking bill and a statistical analysis based on the Heckman probit model, the author shows that tenure stability of longstanding governors allows them to shelve unwelcome presidential bills through their senators. In the case of the anti-smoking bill, longstanding governors of tobacco-producing provinces successfully defended their provincial interests using two strategies: shelving the bill until the last minute and introducing an amendment proposal. The statistical analysis reveals that senators strategically make their choice between credit-claiming and position-taking activities according to their principals at the provincial level.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Developing EconomiesJapan External Trade OrganizationChibaJapan

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