Abstract
Although AES has become the predominant standard for symmetric block ciphers, T-DES is still widely used especially for electronic payment and financial solutions. In order to protect small and embedded devices against power analysis and side-channel attacks in general, appropriate countermeasures have to be considered. In this paper, we present the first practical application of the Domain-Oriented Masking (DOM) scheme for the T-DES cipher in hardware and provide practical evaluation results that confirm the security of DOM and our designs. In particular, using Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) as evaluation methodology confirms that our first- and second-order secure architectures do not exhibit detectable leakage using up to 2 billion traces. This is the first paper that presents a T-DES hardware implementation using a state of the art provable secure masking technique.
P. Sasdrich—This work was done while the author was at Cryptography Research.
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A Representations of all S-boxes and \(4 \times 4\) Permutations
A Representations of all S-boxes and \(4 \times 4\) Permutations
1.1 A.1 Algebraic Normal Form for S-Box 1
1.2 A.2 Algebraic Normal Form for S-Box 2
1.3 A.3 Algebraic Normal Form for S-Box 3
1.4 A.4 Algebraic Normal Form for S-Box 4
1.5 A.5 Algebraic Normal Form for S-Box 5
1.6 A.6 Algebraic Normal Form for S-Box 6
1.7 A.7 Algebraic Normal Form for S-Box 7
1.8 A.8 Algebraic Normal Form for S-Box 8
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Sasdrich, P., Hutter, M. (2018). Protecting Triple-DES Against DPA. In: Fan, J., Gierlichs, B. (eds) Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design. COSADE 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10815. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89641-0_12
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