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An On-Demand Defense Scheme Against DNS Cache Poisoning Attacks

  • Zheng WangEmail author
  • Shui Yu
  • Scott Rose
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering book series (LNICST, volume 238)

Abstract

The threats of caching poisoning attacks largely stimulate the deployment of DNSSEC. Being a strong but demanding cryptographical defense, DNSSEC has its universal adoption predicted to go through a lengthy transition. Thus the DNSSEC practitioners call for a secure yet lightweight solution to speed up DNSSEC deployment while offering an acceptable DNSSEC-like defense. This paper proposes a new On-Demand Defense (ODD) scheme against cache poisoning attacks, still using but lightly using DNSSEC. In the solution, DNS operates in DNSSEC-oblivious mode unless a potential attack is detected and triggers a switch to DNSSEC-aware mode. The modeling checking results demonstrate that only a small DNSSEC query load is needed by the ODD scheme to ensure a small enough cache poisoning success rate.

Keywords

DNS Security Extensions DNS cache poisoning Model checking Query load Success rate 

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Copyright information

© ICST Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.National Institute of Standards and TechnologyGaithersburgUSA
  2. 2.School of Information TechnologyDeakin UniversityBurwoodAustralia

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