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Bivalence, Future Contingents and the Open Future

  • Fabrice Correia
  • Sven Rosenkranz
Chapter
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 395)

Abstract

In this chapter we critically discuss the objection that since truths require grounds, the Growing Block Theory must take bivalence to fail for future contingents, while it proves at odds with the best account of such a failure. We challenge the version of the grounding requirement driving this objection, devise a better formulation, and show that the theory can retain bivalence and accommodate an interesting form of indeterminism. After rehearsing the objection in Sect. 7.1, in Sect. 7.2 we review different ways to articulate the grounding requirement, conclude that it should suffice that, for any tensed truth, sometimes there be grounds for it, and show how this requirement can be met by contingent truths about the future. In Sect. 7.3 we explicate a conception of the asymmetry between the open future and the fixed past, consistent with bivalence and available to the Growing Block Theory but none of its rivals.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Fabrice Correia
    • 1
  • Sven Rosenkranz
    • 2
    • 3
  1. 1.Département de PhilosophieUniversité de GenèveGenèveSwitzerland
  2. 2.ICREABarcelonaSpain
  3. 3.Departament de FilosofiaUniversitat de BarcelonaBarcelonaSpain

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