The Epistemic Objection

  • Fabrice Correia
  • Sven Rosenkranz
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 395)


In this chapter we critically discuss the so-called epistemic objection against the Growing Block Theory of time and argue that it rests on flawed conceptions of tense and of the import of the theory’s main tenets. We show how the theory enables knowledge of the location of the edge of reality that it posits. After introducing the epistemic objection as it figures in the extant literature, we argue in Sect. 6.1 and Sect. 6.2 that this objection either rests on a gross misunderstanding of the theory’s conception of the past, or else on a gross misunderstanding of the way in which utterances, or judgements, with tensed contents are evaluated for truth and falsity. In Sect. 6.3 we provide a constructive response to the remaining challenge, viz. to show how we might know that we are not in the past of the growing block’s edge of becoming.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Fabrice Correia
    • 1
  • Sven Rosenkranz
    • 2
    • 3
  1. 1.Département de PhilosophieUniversité de GenèveGenèveSwitzerland
  2. 2.ICREABarcelonaSpain
  3. 3.Departament de FilosofiaUniversitat de BarcelonaBarcelonaSpain

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