In this chapter we introduce the relations of temporal location and precedence, critically review McTaggart’s conception of the existential import of these relations, and devise axioms governing them that are acceptable to permanentists and temporaryists alike. In Sect 3.1 we critically review McTaggart’s characterisation of the B-series according to which B-series relations are permanent, distinguish between two relevant senses of ‘permanent’ as applied to relations, and show that depending on whether such relations are taken as existence-entailing, on either reading, temporaryists can consistently avail themselves of such relations. In Sect. 3.2 we clarify the relation of temporal location by laying down axioms for it, taking into account things in time of various kinds. In Sect. 3.3 we first provide axioms for the relation of precedence amongst times, and then use it to define a relation of precedence for things in time quite generally.
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