Existence, Quantification and Identity
In this chapter we introduce the distinction between permanentist and temporaryist ontologies and present a non-classical theory of unrestricted quantification and identity that is compatible with either type of view. We discuss and defuse a recent objection that temporaryism cannot accommodate unrestricted quantification. In Sect. 2.1 we use temporal operators and quantification in order to articulate the core tenets of permanentism and temporaryism, and show that static conceptions of reality are committed to permanentism. In Sect. 2.2 we observe that classical quantification theory favours permanentism, and for reasons of neutrality, replace it by a quantification theory that, jointly with corresponding axioms for identity, yields a positive free logic. In Sect. 2.3 we reject T. Williamson’s argument meant to show that temporaryists should endorse the so-called temporal being constraint, lest they be accused of using restricted quantification when articulating their view.
- Broad, C. D. (1923). Scientific thought. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
- Correia, F., & Rosenkranz, S. (2011). As time Goes by. Eternal facts in an ageing universe. Paderborn: Mentis.Google Scholar
- Correia, F., & Rosenkranz, S. (2015b). Presentism without Presentness. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 4, 19–27.Google Scholar
- Rosenkranz, S. (2012). In Defence of Ockhamism, Philosophia – Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 40, 617–31, reprinted as ‘In Defense of Ockhamism’ in J. M. Fischer and P. Todd (eds.), Freedom, Fatalism, and Foreknowledge, New York 2015: Oxford University Press, 343–60.Google Scholar