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Preference Change

  • Fenrong Liu
Chapter
Part of the Springer Undergraduate Texts in Philosophy book series (SUTP)

Abstract

The notion of preference is important in philosophy, decision theory, and many other disciplines. It is the interplay of information and preferences that provides the driving force behind what we actually do. The chapter adds a new focus and argues that preference is not static, instead, it changes dynamically when triggered by various kinds of events. We show that how a wide variety of preference changes can be modeled in logic, thereby providing the formal philosopher with a natural extension of the scope of inquiry in the area of preference.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyTsinghua UniversityBeijingChina
  2. 2.Tsinghua University – The University of Amsterdam JRC for LogicBeijingChina

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