Securing Finance: Risk, Pre-emption and Resilience

  • John G. Glenn
Part of the International Political Economy Series book series (IPES)


This chapter examines the changes that have been made to the new financial architecture in the aftermath of the financial crisis. In so doing, the chapter argues that, rather than challenging the management of finance, the reforms have relied mainly upon previous methods albeit in more intensive form. Resilience thinking is apparent, but not the radical post-modern version discussed in Chap.  4. Rather, resilience thinking in policy-making tends to dovetail with other neo-liberal policy reforms and is quite interventionist in its approach in contrast to that predicted by the post-modernist variant of resilience thinking.

The chapter argues that with regard to the financial system, neo-liberal governmentality continues to adopt policies that are analogous to biopolitical strategies. The enframing of the financial system has traditionally been centred around a ‘naturalistic fallacy’. This mode of thinking has clearly continued after the crisis, so that the emphasis has been less on radical reform and more on establishing more restrictive risk parameters and strengthening the nodal points of the system in order that it can withstand economic shocks and the homeostatic ‘norm’ can be reinstated. In addition, the perceived unpredictability of the financial system has led to a stronger emphasis on pre-emption and surveillance. The intensity of surveillance alongside these pre-emptive policies and the degree of coordination between various supervisory bodies since the crisis is such that we can speak of the emergence of a new financial regime. The chapter therefore argues that despite much debate on the emergence of resilience thinking, in the financial sphere at least, there has been little in the way of radical new policy changes of the post-modernist variant discussed in Chap.  4. Rather, resilience thinking in practice actually works symbiotically with and relies upon an array of neo-liberal policies. The chapter also concludes that although the policy of pre-emption has the potential to reinforce the regulatory mechanism, it fails to overcome the paradoxes associated with intervention in a highly complex system.


Financial reform Post-crisis regulation Biopolitics Surveillance Pre-emption 


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • John G. Glenn
    • 1
  1. 1.Politics and International RelationsUniversity of SouthamptonSouthamptonUK

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