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Central Banks and Banking Regulation: Historical Legacies and Institutional Challenges

  • Jacint Jordana
  • Guillermo Rosas
Chapter
Part of the Executive Politics and Governance book series (EXPOLGOV)

Abstract

Jordana and Rosas explore the different institutional models for the regulation of banks and financial services that exist worldwide. They find, on the one hand, many countries in which central banks have significant responsibilities for the regulation of the banking system, but also, on the other hand, countries where banking regulation is completely separated from the central bank, remaining in the hands of the executive or being delegated to an independent agency without subordination to the central bank. The chapter identifies the distribution of institutional regulatory models around the world, the possibility of path dependence in the choice of these models, and the relationship between these institutional models and the objectives of price stability and bank stability in different economies.

Keywords

Independent regulatory agencies Monetary policy Banking crisis Interest rate Financial regulation 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institut Barcelona d’Estudis InternacionalsBarcelonaSpain
  2. 2.Department of Political and Social SciencesUniversitat Pompeu FabraBarcelonaSpain
  3. 3.Washington University in St. LouisSt. LouisUSA

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