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Understanding Safety Management Through Strategic Design, Political, and Cultural Approaches

  • John S. Carroll
Chapter

Abstract

As the author shows, we need more than one lens when discussing the failure or success of error reporting. Looking through the strategic design lens, reporting should be part of everyone’s job description. Examined through the political lens, reporting systems are intertwined with power, status, and relationships and lead to conflicts that have to be addressed. Reporting becomes a cultural habit when people see others reporting, and these role models tell stories about having an impact from their reporting. The author explains how when people see that reporting helps address common problems, it becomes meaningful in a way that is not just part of a job description.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • John S. Carroll
    • 1
  1. 1.CambridgeUSA

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