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Economic Relationships and Trust

  • Robert P. Gilles
Chapter

Abstract

Trust is essential for the functioning of the social division of labour and the wealth creation processes that it embodies. Indeed, through the building of a role in the social division of labour one makes oneself completely dependent on other individuals to assume complementary roles. The analytical framework of a socio-economic space allows a complete analysis of this trusting behaviour. This chapter applies duality theory to identify five forms of trust and trustworthiness that underlie economic wealth generation processes in a social division of labour. This is accomplished through a reconstruction of embeddedness and role-building. This methodology also introduces a way of identifying what constitutes economic behaviour in comparison with other forms of social behaviour.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robert P. Gilles
    • 1
  1. 1.Management SchoolQueen’s University BelfastBelfastUK

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