A Framework for Modelling Wealth Creation

  • Robert P. Gilles


This chapter introduces a theoretical construct, referred to as a “socio-economic space”, in which one can analyse the functioning of the social division of labour. This socio-economic space provides a framework in which to consider how economic agents interact, assume roles in the social division of labour, build networks and bring about institutional innovation through entrepreneurial activities. Particularly, this theoretical construct allows an analysis of how institutions govern wealth creation processes and how institutions change: economic agents are embedded in the governing socio-economic institutions through their socio-economic role in the networks that make up the trade infrastructure in the social division of labour. On the other hand, their entrepreneurial activities affect the functionality of these institutions and create new institutions.


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robert P. Gilles
    • 1
  1. 1.Management SchoolQueen’s University BelfastBelfastUK

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