Exploring the Contributing Factors Associated with Intelligence Failures During the Cold War

Abstract

The goal of this chapter is to assess “intelligence failures,” as defined by existing literature, in order to determine whether the failures can be attributed (at least in part) to a failure or inadequate use of technical-based or non-technical based intelligence gathering methods. Two case studies are considered in this analysis: the placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962 and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The results of the analysis conclude that while there are some technology-based intelligence failures evident in each case study, the bulk of the failure can be linked to an oversight or misuse of non-technical intelligence gathering methods. However, most striking is the pre-existing notions within the United States intelligence community that can be linked to how and why the community overlooked critical human, cultural, economic, and ethnic-based intelligence. Therefore, the analysis concludes with the suggestion that the two case studies are considered “intelligence failures” due to the internal failures of the intelligence community. Biases and pressure to deliver conclusions according to the political administration’s preferences continue to impact the analyses coming from the US intelligence community. How the US intelligence community should address this failure remains unclear and requires future research that would be strengthened by the inclusion of additional case studies.