Overseeing Institutions

  • Joseph Berechman
Chapter

Abstract

Transportation agencies can be viewed as specialized institutions whose mission is to supply transportation facilities and services within defined geographic regions. How well do they accomplish their mission, especially with respect to the choice of worthy transportation projects?

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Joseph Berechman
    • 1
  1. 1.City College of New YorkUniversity of New YorkNew YorkUSA

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