Ratio Legis pp 119-136 | Cite as

Nonconsequential Conception of Neutrality

  • Wojciech Ciszewski


In the paper, I focus on the nonconsequential conception of state neutrality. I claim that we can distinguish three such conceptions: justificatory neutrality, intentional neutrality, and expressive neutrality. Each of them is based on a different understanding of the rationale of an action. The idea of justificatory neutrality provides a constraint on the types of reasons that may legitimately support political decisions. Intentional neutrality refers to considerations that move political decision makers. Expressive neutrality states that the most important aspect of a political action is an attitude that this action expresses. The aim of my research is twofold. I would like, first, to clarify the meaning and distinctiveness of each conception and, second, to propose the defensible variant of state neutrality principle drawing on this classification.


State neutrality principle Political perfectionism Conceptions of the good Legislative intent Expressivism 


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Wojciech Ciszewski
    • 1
  1. 1.Jagiellonian UniversityKrakowPoland

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