Cyber Weaponry pp 185-195 | Cite as

Researching Cyber Weapons: An Enumerative Bibliography

Chapter
Part of the Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications book series (ASTSA)

Abstract

Scholarly literature about cyber weapons can be found in a number of sources, especially in college and university libraries. Articles published in the subject areas of computer science, engineering, export controls, law and military studies are also among the best sources of current analysis assuming they are peer-reviewed and substantiated with research sources. Patent applications, blog posts, and government documents may also provide researchers with valuable information about cyber weapons at various stages of the development and deployment processes. Bibliographies, whether analytic or enumerative, offer researchers a short cut to the relevant published material on the topic. This chapter presents an enumerative bibliography of sources with an overview of other methods useful in locating scholarly papers or updating the ones already found.

Keywords

Enumerative bibliography Literature review Cyber weapons 

Books

Frequently Cited or Influential Books

  1. Schmitt MN (ed) (2017) Tallinn manual 2.0 on the international law applicable to cyber operations. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  2. Tallinn 2.0, “intended as an objective restatement of the lex lata,” (p.3) follows the influential 2013 Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare. Both reflect international law experts’ opinions on the current international law governing cyber operations, so neither work advances policy or the politics of any nation. Tallinn 2.0 includes 154 “black letter” rules with commentary on each and goes beyond operations conducted as part of armed conflict to address operations more broadlyGoogle Scholar
  3. Schmitt MN (ed) (2013) Tallinn manual on the international law applicable to cyber warfare: prepared by the international group of experts at the invitation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  4. “In 2009, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (NATO CCD COE), an international military organization based in Tallinn, Estonia, and accredited in 2008 by NATO as a ‘Centre of Excellence,’ invited an independent ‘International Group of Experts’ to produce a manual on the law governing cyber warfare” (p.1). While not an official document, the Tallinn Manual was an attempt by a group of these experts to identify and address all the legal issues both in offensive and defensive operationsGoogle Scholar

Other Influential Books

  1. Allhoff F, Henschke A, Strawser BJ (eds) (2016) Binary bullets: the ethics of cyberwarfare. Oxford University Press, New YorkGoogle Scholar
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  20. Law Review/Journal Articles

      Frequently-Cited Articles

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Other Relevant Articles

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  37. Non-law Articles and Book Chapters

      Frequently-Cited Article

      1. Lin H (2009) Lifting the veil on cyber offense. IEEE Secur Priv 7(4):15–21. Based on a 2009 National Research Council report, “Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding US Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities,” this article highlights the lack of information about US offensive capabilities and the uncertainty surrounding offensive cyberattacks as instruments of US policyCrossRefGoogle Scholar

Other Relevant Articles and Chapters

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  37. Gray Literature

      Frequently-Cited Report

      1. Mandiant (Firm) (2013) APT1: exposing one of China’s cyber espionage units. Mandiant, Alexandria. Security firm Mandiant, now a Fireeye company, issued this report after extensive research, concluding APT1 is likely sponsored by China and has been implicated in wide-ranging cyber espionage operations since 2006Google Scholar

    Other Relevant Reports

    1. Bilge L, Dumitras T (2012) Before we knew it: an empirical study of zero-day attacks in the real world. In: Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on computer and communications security. pp 833–844Google Scholar
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    4. Center for Cyber and Homeland Security (2016) Into the gray zone: the private sector and active defense against cyber threats. George Washington University, Washington, DCGoogle Scholar
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    19. Shakarian P (2017) The enemy has a voice: understanding threats to inform smart investment in cyber defense. New America Foundation, Washington, DCGoogle Scholar
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    21. Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual–Use Goods and Technologies (2017) Public documents volume II: list of dual-use goods and technologies and munitions list. pp 1–234Google Scholar
    22. Zhioua, S. 2013. The Middle East under malware attack dissecting cyber weapons. Proceedings – International conference on distributed computing systems pp. 11–16.Google Scholar

Government Documents

    Frequently-Cited Government Documents

    1. United States (2015a) Chapter XVI cyber operations. In: Department of defense law of war manual. General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Washington, DC. The Manual represents the position of the Department of Defense, not necessarily the US government as a whole. Chapter XVI, “Cyber Operations,” comprises only 15 pages of the 1,220–page-long Manual but provides more transparency about the Department of Defense’s cyber operations generally. Some of the Manual’s positions on international law differ from those seen in the Tallinn Manual Google Scholar
    2. United States Air Force (2011) Air Force Instruction 51-402, Legal Reviews of Weapons and Cyber Capabilities. The instruction was issued to reflect “a change in the Air Force definition of ‘weapon’ and requires a legal review of cyber capabilities intended for use in cyberspace operations” (p.1)Google Scholar

Other Relevant Government Documents

  1. Canada (2010) Canada’s cyber security strategyGoogle Scholar
  2. Government Accountability Office, Washington DC, Belkin P (2014) NATO’s Wales summit: expected outcomes and key challengesGoogle Scholar
  3. Los Alamos National Laboratory & United States (2015) What is the current state of the science of cyber defense? United States. Dept. of Energy, Washington, DCGoogle Scholar
  4. Ministry of Defence (2016) The cyber primer, 2nd edn. Ministry of Defence, LondonGoogle Scholar
  5. Russian Federation (2011) Conceptual views regarding the activities of the armed forces of the Russian Federation in information spaceGoogle Scholar
  6. Sandia National Laboratories & United States (2015) Evaluating moving target defense with PLADD. United States. Dept. of Defense, Washington, DCGoogle Scholar
  7. United Kingdom (2010) A strong Britain in an age of uncertainty: the national security strategyGoogle Scholar
  8. United Kingdom (2011) The UK cyber security strategy: protecting and promoting the UK in a digitized worldGoogle Scholar
  9. United States (2011) Strategy for operating in cyberspace. Department of Defense, Washington, DCGoogle Scholar
  10. United States (2010) The White House. National security strategyGoogle Scholar
  11. United States (2013) Joint publication 3–12 on cyberspace operations. Department of Defense, Washington, DCGoogle Scholar
  12. United States (2014) Army techniques publication 3–36 (FM3–36). Electronic warfare techniques.Google Scholar
  13. United States (2015b) Defense cybersecurity: opportunities exist for DOD to share cybersecurity resources with small businesses. United States Government Accountability Office, Washington, DCGoogle Scholar
  14. United States (2015c) Defense infrastructure: Improvements in DOD reporting and cybersecurity implementation needed to enhance utility resilience planning. United States Government Accountability Office, Washington, DCGoogle Scholar
  15. United States (2015d) The department of defense cyber strategy. Department of Defense, Washington, DCGoogle Scholar
  16. United States (2017) Army field manual 3–12, Cyberspace and electronic warfare operationsGoogle Scholar
  17. US Strategic Command (2009) The cyber warfare lexicon: a language to support the development, testing, planning and employment of cyber weapons and other modern warfare capabilities. Version 1.7.6Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.George Washington University Law SchoolWashington, DCUSA

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