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An Overview of the Usage of Default Passwords

  • Brandon Knieriem
  • Xiaolu Zhang
  • Philip Levine
  • Frank Breitinger
  • Ibrahim Baggili
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering book series (LNICST, volume 216)

Abstract

The recent Mirai botnet attack demonstrated the danger of using default passwords and showed it is still a major problem. In this study we investigated several common applications and their password policies. Specifically, we analyzed if these applications: (1) have default passwords or (2) allow the user to set a weak password (i.e., they do not properly enforce a password policy). Our study shows that default passwords are still a significant problem: 61% of applications inspected initially used a default or blank password. When changing the password, 58% allowed a blank password, 35% allowed a weak password of 1 character.

Keywords

Default passwords Applications Usage Security 

Notes

Acknowledgements

Special thanks go to Mohammed Nasir who initially started this research project and Matthew Vastarelli for supporting us.

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Copyright information

© ICST Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Brandon Knieriem
    • 1
  • Xiaolu Zhang
    • 1
  • Philip Levine
    • 1
  • Frank Breitinger
    • 1
  • Ibrahim Baggili
    • 1
  1. 1.Cyber Forensics Research and Education Group (UNHcFREG)Tagliatela College of Engineering, University of New HavenWest HavenUSA

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