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Customary International Law

  • John YooEmail author
  • Ivana Stradner
Chapter

Résumé

Dans ce chapitre, nous étudions le débat sur la nature et les sources du Droit international coutumier. Le Droit international coutumier qui est le Droit qui lie les nations sans être exprimé dans des traités a traditionnellement deux sources: la pratique étatique et l'opinio juris. Contrairement à la plupart des auteurs, nous soutenons que l'opinio juris devrait avoir peu de valeur dans la détermination du Droit international coutumier. En revanche, en utilisant une approche fondée sur un choix rationnel, nous montrons que les pratiques étatiques passées devraient déterminer des normes internationales puisqu'elles sont les seuls signaux significatifs qui permettent de dépasser les obstacles à la coopération entre nations

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Berkeley Law, UC BerkeleyBerkeleyUSA
  2. 2.Center for European Studies, Harvard UniversityCambridgeUSA

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