Leighton-Micali Hash-Based Signatures in the Quantum Random-Oracle Model

  • Edward EatonEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10719)


Digital signatures constructed solely from hash functions offer competitive signature sizes and fast signing and verifying times. Moreover, the security of hash functions against a quantum adversary is believed to be well understood. This means that hash-based signatures are strong candidates for standard use in a post-quantum world. The Leighton-Micali signature scheme (LMS) is one such scheme being considered for standardization. However all systematic analyses of LMS have only considered a classical adversary. In this work we close this gap by showing a proof of the security of LMS in the quantum random-oracle model. Our results match the bounds imposed by Grover’s search algorithm within a constant factor, and remain tight in the multi-user setting.


Post-quantum cryptography Digital signatures Random oracles Hash functions Multi-user setting 



Thanks to Gus Gutoski and Alfred Menezes for insightful discussion, as well as their helpful editorial skills. Additional thanks to Philip Lafrance.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.ISARA CorporationWaterlooCanada
  2. 2.University of WaterlooWaterlooCanada

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