Trust in Public Organizations: An Explanation for Noncooperative Behavior

  • István Takács
  • Katalin Takács-György


Using game theory, this chapter discusses the economic aspects of the noncooperative behavior of partners. Trust is a fundamental requirement in collaboration and cooperation among partners. Due to information asymmetry between the participants and a lack of confidence, individual and social expenditures may be economically unreasonable. This chapter uses game theory to introduce and explain how information asymmetry among members of the society and differences between the interests of the partners influence public trust. The point of view of this approach, despite its altruism, is that all people and (nonbusiness) organizations that compete and try to maximize their benefits are participants in different types of games.


Information asymmetries Theory of games Transaction costs Cooperative behavior 


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • István Takács
    • 1
  • Katalin Takács-György
    • 1
  1. 1.Óbuda University BudapestBudapestHungary

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