Single-Party Governments as a Cause and Coalitions as a Consequence of Coups in Turkey

  • Ali T. Akarca
Chapter

Abstract

Economic performance under coalition governments, especially under those involving both right- and left-wing parties, is not as good as under single-party governments. Investigating the 1950–2015 period historically, as well as empirically through descriptive statistics and regression analysis, it is shown that such governments in Turkey were created artificially by the military, using coups as a tool to design Turkish politics. The causes and consequences of such interventions are discussed. In particular, it is shown that adverse impacts of coups in Turkey were not restricted to the periods of military rule but continued far into the future through the chain of coalition governments they have engendered.

Keywords

Turkey Coup Coalition Election Voter behaviour Effective number of parties 

JEL Codes

D72 H11 O53 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ali T. Akarca
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of Illinois at ChicagoChicagoUSA

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