Existential Assertions for Voting Protocols

  • R. Ramanujam
  • Vaishnavi Sundararajan
  • S. P. Suresh
Conference paper
First Online:
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10323)

Abstract

In [21], we extended the Dolev-Yao model with assertions. We build on that work and add existential abstraction to the language, which allows us to translate common constructs used in voting protocols into proof properties. We also give an equivalence-based definition of anonymity in this model, and prove anonymity for the FOO protocol.

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Copyright information

© International Financial Cryptography Association 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • R. Ramanujam
    • 1
  • Vaishnavi Sundararajan
    • 2
  • S. P. Suresh
    • 2
  1. 1.The Institute of Mathematical SciencesChennaiIndia
  2. 2.Chennai Mathematical Institute and UMI ReLaXChennaiIndia

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