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T-MAC: Protecting Mandatory Access Control System Integrity from Malicious Execution Environment on ARM-Based Mobile Devices

  • Diming ZhangEmail author
  • Liangqiang Chen
  • Fei Xue
  • Hao Wu
  • Hao HuangEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10599)

Abstract

Mobile security has become increasingly important in mobile computing, hence mandatory access control (MAC) systems have been widely used to protect it. However, malicious code in the mobile system may have significantly impact to the integrity of these MAC systems by forcing them to make the wrong access control decision, because they are running on the same privilege level and memory address space. Therefore, for a trusted MAC system, it is desired to be isolated from the malicious mobile system at runtime. In this paper, we propose a trusted MAC isolation framework called T-MAC to solve this problem. T-Mac puts the MAC system into the enclave provided by the ARM TrustZone so as to avert the direct impact of the malicious code on the access decision process. In the meanwhile, T-MAC provides a MAC supplicant client which runs in the mobile system kernel to effectively lookup policy decisions made by the back-end MAC service in the enclave and to enforce these rules on the system with trustworthy behaviors. Moreover, to protect T-MAC components that are not in the enclave, we not only provide a protection mechanism that enables TrustZone to protect the specific memory region from the compromised system, but establish a secure communication channel between the mobile system and the enclave as well. The prototype is based on SELinux, which is the widely used MAC system, and the base of SEAndroid. The experimental results show that SELinux receives enough protection, and the performance degradation that ranges between 0.53% to 7.34% compared to the original by employing T-MAC.

Keywords

Trust Mandatory access control Isolation ARM TrustZone 

Notes

Acknowledgments

This work was supported by the National Science Foundation of China grants No. 61321491, and in part by Commission of Economy and Information Technology grants the project of the security protection foundation of operating system based on hardware resource isolation mechanism.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Computer Science and TechnologyNanjing UniversityNanjingChina
  2. 2.School of Computer Science and EngineeringJiangsu University of Science and TechnologyZhenjiangChina

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